Today, National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan and Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Dai Bingguo go into the second day of the 13th round of talks to settle the long-running border dispute between India and China. A little more than a month later, two divisions of around 50,000 Indian troops are, as of now, scheduled to take their place along the disputed border in Arunachal Pradesh.
This, in a sense, captures the strange dichotomy that has come to characterise the complicated relationship between the two countries. At the highest levels, the refrain from the two governments has been harmonious. No longer does the border hold hostage the relationship between the two countries. Economic ties are booming. There is an increasing convergence of interests on the global stage, from climate change to common interests at the
Doha talks at the World Trade Organisation. But below the surface, analysts on both sides of the border caution that little progress has been made in overcoming a trust-deficit. A legacy of the 1962 war, it continues to cast a long shadow on other areas of engagement between the two countries.
Stilted debates on both the border dispute and other aspects of strategic engagement continue to dominate national conversations in India and China, and a consequent hardening of public opinion has created an atmosphere that has made meaningful engagement difficult for both governments. In India, a simplistic hostile-expansionist caricature of China continues to dominate portrayals in the media. In China, India is often reductively presented as a jealous, insecure neighbour that resents everything about the country’s rise.
Bridging this perception gap, analysts say, is the biggest challenge the two countries face. It is crucial for meaningful progress to be made not just in settling the border dispute, but in taking bilateral ties to the next level.
The last few months have seen a few signs of new tensions. While India and China have both pledged to maintain peace and tranquillity along the 4,000 km-border, a threat perception on both sides persists. Earlier this year, India announced a number of measures aimed at fortifying its defences, from moving two divisions of troops to plans of setting up air bases along the border. And in April, China declared it would block the Asian Development Bank’s US$ 60 million flood management project in Arunachal Pradesh — a reminder that in foreign policy, despite outward statements to the contrary, issues are never really compartmentalised. China’s claims on the State, and the region of Tawang, have seemingly hardened. There are no signs that the two countries’ far-removed positions on the status of the eastern territories have in any way moved closer after 13 rounds of negotiations.
A turning point in the relationship between the two countries was Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988. It marked the beginning of the current parallel-track strategy of delinking, to some extent, the border dispute from other areas of engagement. Political analysts in China and India agree there has been considerable progress since, especially on the economic front, where trade increased from a paltry few million dollars to $52 billion last year, far exceeding targets. But there are also concerns that if long-standing political disputes are left unresolved, other areas of engagement will soon face barriers.
In China, the rapid growth in bilateral trade, and the fact that China recently became India’s largest trading partner, is viewed favourably. But there is a perception of ’stagnation’ in other areas of engagement. “There is no question there is optimism regarding bilateral relations as a whole in China,” says Zheng Ruixiang, former Chinese ambassador to India. “We welcome the fact that the border issue is no longer an obstacle to relations between the two countries. There are a number of multilateral opportunities now — in BRIC, ties with Russia, the G8+5, on terrorism, climate change, battling the financial crisis and with the International Monetary Fund.”
Nevertheless, there is frustration at the little progress the countries have made on the border talks. Chinese officials often point to the country’s settling of all of its other disputes in the last decade — with Vietnam, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Russia, and possibly Bhutan in the near future. Even with Japan, a country with which China has had a more strained relationship, far more progress has been made in settling a long-running dispute on naval boundaries. The two countries have even begun to jointly develop oil projects in disputed waters.
India is seen as the exception. “We have settled our surrounding issues on the principle of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation,” Mr. Zheng says. “But we have faced difficulties with India.” One common view in China is that most Indian governments, usually under the pressures of coalition politics, simply do not have the political mandate and will to make the necessary concessions and sell a settlement. “In academic circles, we believe relations have been, at some level, stagnant in the last few years,” says Lan Jianxue of the China Institute of International Studies. “And we expect to see movement for the better. The danger is if we stay at this level, it is clear our relationship with India will fall behind other relationships.”
Zorawar Daulet Singh of the Centre for Policy Alternatives, New Delhi, says it is “debatable” if this model of engagement has produced “the desired objective.” He adds: “Much is made of the bilateral trade, but such a pattern of trade [driven by Indian exports of low-end raw materials, such as iron ore] is not sustainable. The bilateral relationship will find it difficult to overcome the trust deficit that an unresolved border perpetuates and deepen ties beyond a certain point.”
“The two countries cannot let the status quo linger indefinitely,” adds Brigadier Arun Sahgal of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi, who has had experience in engaging with China on the border issue.
To begin with, he says India needs “a more coherent” China strategy. “We haven’t really thought out a long-term strategy,” he says. “Putting the border issue, the economy, and military engagement into separate compartments does not work beyond a point. We need better calibration at the highest levels for more meaningful engagement.”
A new variable in the equation between the two countries is an increasing convergence of interests at the global level, from climate change to the Doha talks at the WTO. However, it is unlikely that this will lead to a significant softening in positions on issues closer to home. “This dichotomy of discord and collaboration is unlikely to disappear,” Mr. Singh says.
“From an Indian strategic perspective, its core security interests lie in the subcontinent — territorial integrity, economic development, peaceful and a secure periphery — and those can never be sacrificed or mortgaged for greater cooperation with China at the global or institutional level.” The way forward, analysts on both sides of the border say, is to begin by reducing misperceptions and improving the level of debate in both countries.
Managing public opinion is beginning to be viewed as an increasingly important challenge for both countries, something that is crucial to reducing the trust-deficit and the perception gap.
“It is a big challenge for India and China to better understand mainstream opinions,” Mr. Lan remarks. “Public opinion is an important factor, and it constrains negotiations. A more agreeable atmosphere is needed for a decisive breakthrough.” In his understanding, in both India and China, “people read overly nationalistic papers that sensationalise views to sell copies and assume those views to be a national consensus.” Improving cooperation between the two militaries, as well as cooperating more on global issues of common interest, will in the long-run help to reduce perception gaps and “create the right conditions for settling the dispute.”
Mr. Singh agrees: “India’s China discourse has suffered from a troubling pattern that has precluded a sophisticated appraisal of China,” he says. “At one level, we have a romantic view that nurtures a deluded image of China.
To dispel the first illusion we have the mirror image — an inveterate hostility toward China. And the result of this distorted national conversation is a lack of a sensible analysis on China’s intentions and capabilities.”
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